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27 February 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Warning Working Group Members

SUBJECT : Agenda for Next Meeting [ ]

1. We will meet Friday, 2 March, at 1315 in Room 7E62. [ ]

2. Topics:

-- NIT II.1 production strategy (draft attached).  
I would like to flesh this out by designating  
lead agencies and tentative dates. NIO/SP  
and NIO/CF have been invited to sit in on this  
item. [ ]

-- Relations with RMS. You will remember I cir-  
culated a draft some time ago, but another copy  
is attached. Please let me know in advance if  
you have major problems; in that case I will  
invite an RMS representative. [ ]

-- [ ]

-- Any other topics anyone wishes to raise. Please  
let me know ASAP. [ ]

3. I also expect to be able to give you the DCI's reaction to  
the SWS paper. [ ]

[ ]  
Richard Lehman  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

Attachments

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Resource Management Staff Relationship  
With the Warning Working Group

RMS should inform the Working Group of emerging Resource Management issues that we perceive to be explicitly related to the Community's warning capabilities. These warning issues could result from our routine evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of all ongoing programs or from ad hoc assessments of new programs conducted as part of the budget review process. In addition, RMS should, on request, provide the Working Group:

- best estimates of current and future resources allocated to specific warning functions;
- assistance in evaluating the effects of potential changes in current I&W activities on resource needs;
- general perspectives on how well I&W fares in competition with other intelligence missions for the resources available.

For its part, the Working Group could:

- assist in identifying those Community activities that should be classified as directly supporting the I&W mission;
- inform the RMS of emerging major initiatives designed to improve warning capability and/or reduce costs;
- propose or help evaluate candidate measures of effectiveness that might be used to assess the warning contributions of different collection and production activities;
- advise on the overall warning value of specific programs under consideration by the RMS.

Production Strategy

II. The USSR and Eastern Europe

1. *How much warning of an attack can the United States expect? To what extent are Soviet active and passive measures likely to degrade warning?*

1. The Community's response to this NIT will take two main forms:

-- A continuing program of research directed at the question: how much warning time (weeks/days/hours) can be expected prior to an attack by the Soviet Union (Warsaw Pact) against NATO forces in Europe (theater attack) or the United States (strategic attack)?

-- A related program supporting DIA's project WISP (Warning Improvement Study and Plan). While WISP is not directly responsive to the NIT, it is aimed at developing the means to provide earlier and more credible warning, and involves a substantial Community effort.

2. Warning Time. The present Community response to this question is NIE 4-1-78. The program outlined below is designed to test the validity of the judgments in the estimate. (EUCOM will be invited to participate).

-- T NIE states that Western intelligence could

supply warning within "one or two days" that the Warsaw Pact was taking steps that would enable it to go to war.

An Interagency Intelligence Memorandum will, based on the scenarios of NIE 4-1, determine those specific

indicators which must take place in the first day or two after the initial order to go to increased readiness, and the likelihood that we would detect them.

-- Based on this work, a second IIM would determine the effect a deliberate cover, concealment, and deception effort would have on our ability to detect these indicators.

-- A third effort, independent of the above, would assess qualitative and quantitative trends in force posture and exercises, as they relate to the Pact's ability to go to increased readiness, since NIE 4-1 was issued.

-- Finally, a Memorandum to Holders of NIE 4-1 will be issued. It will analyze the judgments of the NIE in the light of the work outlined above, and will revalidate or modify them as needed.

-- Separately, NFAC is conducting a study on Soviet doctrine and capabilities for surprise nuclear attack, and the risks and advantages to the USSR from such an attack.

4. WISP. (To be furnished by DIA.)

5. The revised General Indicator list, as prepared and coordinated by SWS, will be formally issued in April.

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6. Any work on CC&D beyond that outlined in Paragraph 3 will be deferred until Community organizational arrangements for handling CC&D questions are established.

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